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COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
  Charles George appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania granting summary judgment in favor of his former 
employer, Wilbur Chocolate Co., Inc. (“Wilbur”), on his age discrimination claim.  For 
the following reasons, we will affirm.   
I. 
   Wilbur hired George in September 2007.  At that time, George was fifty-nine 
years old.  As a new employee, George was hired on a probationary basis and was 
assigned to work in a variety of temporary positions until the company found a 
permanent placement for him.   
 When George began work on October 1, 2007, he was assigned to a packing 
position.  Unhappy as a packer, he asked to be reassigned.  Several weeks later, he began 
training as a dry ingredient handler, but soon discovered that he could not meet the 
demands of that position due to his fear of heights.  As a result, he was reassigned back to 
the packing unit, where he worked for another month.  He then filled in temporarily as a 
lab assistant until the employee who was awarded the position on a permanent basis 
arrived.                
 On January 17, 2008, after he had been with the company for approximately three 
and a half months, George was terminated.  Although he had been given a satisfactory 
evaluation for his work in the lab, the company indicated that it did not believe that he 
would succeed in other positions at the plant.  
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II. 
 On August 15, 2008, George commenced this action against Wilbur in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  In the complaint, George 
claimed that Wilbur had unlawfully terminated him because of his age, in violation of the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.  Wilbur 
moved for summary judgment, and, by order entered April 28, 2010, the District Court 
granted its motion.  George now appeals from the District Court’s order.1   
III. 
 We will affirm the District Court’s entry of summary judgment against George.  
As the District Court correctly noted, George’s claim under the ADEA is governed by the 
burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 
(1973).  Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof and 
production to make out a prima facie case, which means that he must show that: (1) he is 
forty years of age or older; (2) the defendant took an adverse employment action against 
him; (3) he was qualified for the position in question; and (4) he was ultimately replaced 
by another employee who was sufficiently younger to support an inference of 
discriminatory animus.  Smith v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d 684, 689 (3d Cir. 2009).  
“Once the plaintiff satisfies these elements, the burden of production shifts to the 
employer to identify a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment 
                                                 
 
1
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise 
plenary review over an appeal from a grant of summary judgment.  Jacobs Constructors, 
Inc. v. NPS Energy Servs., Inc., 264 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2001).     
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action.”  Id. at 690.  If the employer does so, the burden of production returns to the 
plaintiff, who must demonstrate that the employer’s proffered rationale was a pretext for 
age discrimination.  Id. at 691.   
 Applying this analytical framework to George’s claim, the District Court first 
found that he had failed to make out a prima facie case of age discrimination because he 
had failed to show that similarly situated individuals outside the protected category were 
treated more favorably than he.  We agree.  As the District Court explained, the two 
younger employees whom George claims were unfairly awarded permanent positions 
were not similarly situated to him: they worked on top of the tanker truck at a height 
George refused to work; they never expressed displeasure with any position; and they 
ascended into permanent placements through use of the bidding process, which George 
did not use.  Furthermore, even assuming that George had been able to establish a prima 
facie case, we agree with the District Court that his claim would nonetheless fail because 
Wilbur offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating him—namely, his 
poor overall job performance and his unwillingness to fulfill multiple roles—and George 
did not provide any evidence giving rise to a reasonable inference of pretext.    
IV. 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.   
